***Sections 69-72***

1. *A Well-Ordered Society*
	1. what is a well-ordered society? Note the work done by the publicity condition in ruling out some conceptions of justice. What conceptions might it rule out? (HINT: See section 3 of [this review](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/oct/09/cass-sunstein-its-all-your-own-good/) of an author we’ll read soon.)
	2. Note the remark “There is no necessity to invoke theological or metaphysical doctrines to support its principles, nor to imagine another world that compensates for and corrects inequalities which the two principles permit in this one.” Why would Rawls insist on this? Can belief in another world lead to complacency about injustice in this one?
	3. Under what conditions is one conception of justice more stable than another? Use these conditions to give a preliminary statement of the question Rawls will call that of “relative stability”.
	4. explain the view ascribed to Jeremy Bentham on p. 399. what does Rawls mean by suggesting that this view “flouts” the criterion of stability? Why isn’t Bentham’s view just an artificial invisible hand?
	5. Consider the remark:

Most traditional doctrines hold that to some degree at least human nature is such that we acquire a desire to act justly when we have lived under and benefited from just institutions. To the extent that this is true, a conception of justice is psychologically suited to human inclinations. Moreover, should it turn out that a desire to act justly is also regulative of a rational plan of life, then acting justly is part of our good.

* + 1. What does it mean to say that a desire to act justly is *regulative* of a plan of life?
		2. Suppose Rawls is right about our psychological make-up: human beings can acquire a desire to act from valid conception of justice, and in that circumstance at least, we find that acting from it is part of our good. Does this “fit” between justice and our inclinations imply that humans are naturally good?
	1. What is an equilibrium? What is a stable equilibrium? What is congruence?
		1. Note that at p. 103, Rawls says that an equilibrium state is one “[n]o one has any incentive to alter”. When everyone has a sense of justice, and when the right and the good are congruent, will a well-ordered society be an equilibrium so understood? Explain. Even better, explain with reference to the last paragraph of §60.
	2. what is the difference between saying, as Rawls does, that a *conception of justice* is stable and saying that a *society* is stable (cf. pp. 400-01)? why does Rawls fix on the former and not the latter?
	3. On p. 405 Rawls says “The crucial point is how the general facts of moral psychology affect the choice of principles in the original position.” Does this imply that the account of moral learning Rawls sketches is available to parties in the original position? If so, does this imply that the stability argument of this chapter is addressed primarily to parties in the original position, primarily to us Rawls’s readers, or to both audiences?
	4. what are the two traditions of thought on the development of the moral sentiments? who are the most important thinkers associated with each?
1. *The Morality of Authority – or “From Baptism to First Communion”*
	1. Should we be troubled by Rawls’s qualifier in the remark that a just society includes the family “*in some form*”?
	2. what is the first psychological law Rawls postulates? explain in what way it is a law of reciprocity.
	3. Rawls says “although the child has the potentiality for love, his love of the parents is a new desire brought about by his recognizing their evident love for him” (406). in which of the two traditions of thought about the development of the moral sentiments does this remark locate Rawls? what about the remark that the child “has no original tendency to do the things he is told to do” (407)?
	4. What is “authority guilt”? Why is it important that this sentiment be developed? What would it say about a child if she lacked it?
2. *The Morality of Association – or “From First Communion to Confirmation”*
	1. How is the morality of association adhered to later in life? Does its persistence imply that the virtues in which it shows itself are somehow immature?
	2. what is the second psychological law Rawls postulates? explain how it is a law of reciprocity.
		1. HINT: what does Rawls mean by saying at p. 410 “It seems plausible, then, that acquiring a morality of association (represented by some structure of ideals) rests upon the development of the intellectual skills required to regard things from a variety of points of view and to think of these together as aspects of one system of cooperation.”?
		2. ANOTHER HINT: explain why the “evident intention” of others to do their part is important. (cf. “Here the evident intention to honor one’s obligations and duties is seen as a form of good will, and this recognition arouses feelings of friendship and trust in return.” (p. 412))
	3. explain how the second psychological law presupposes the operation of the first.
	4. Note the remarks about associational guilt on p. 412 and of principle guilt on p. 415.
		1. what role will these sentiments play in keeping justice as fairness stable, in returning it to equilibrium?
		2. Is Rawls right that the acquisition of morality, and of liability to sentiments like guilt, makes the good of friendship possible? (p. 412) If someone lacked the liability to guilt, would she lack the ability to form friendships?
	5. On p. 43, Rawls seems to say that the morality of association can govern even large associations like nation-states. Explain how it does so.
3. *The Morality of Principles – or “From Confirmation to ….”*
	1. Explain the problem Rawls wants to address in this section. (HINT: See the first full sentence on p. 419 where Rawls expresses the desired conclusion, thereby implying that he has successfully defended it.)
	2. Why isn’t the morality of association enough to stabilize a large, modern society? (see p. 415)
	3. What is the third psychological law Rawls postulates? Explain in what way it is a law of reciprocity.
	4. how is the operation of third law triggered by someone’s acquisition of the morality of association?
	5. in what two ways does a sense of justice show itself? how will these manifestations of a sense of justice tend to stabilize justice as fairness?
	6. Explain what Rawls means by saying on p. 416 that once we acquire the morality of principles “Our moral sentiments display an independence from the accidental circumstances of our world, the meaning of this independence being given by the description of the original position and its Kantian interpretation?”. Might someone who is aware of this independence of her sentiments regard it as a good thing? Why?
	7. What worry is Rawls trying to answer in the paragraph beginning “It may seem strange”? How does he answer it? (HINT: What does Rawls mean by saying that the sense of justice “supports those arrangements that enable everyone to express his common nature”? (p. 417))
	8. Rawls remarks “a perfectly just society should be part of an ideal *that rational human beings could desire more than anything else* once they had full knowledge and experience of what it was.” (418) is this too strong a claim?
	9. Explain “The principles of justice answer to these descriptions and this fact allows us to given an acceptable interpretation of the sense of justice.” (p. 418) Then file this remark away because it becomes important later.
	10. Is Rawls right that “the moralities of supererogation, those of the saint and the hero, do not contradict the norms of right and justice; they are marked by the willing adoption by the self of aims continuous with these principles but extending beyond what they enjoin.” (p. 419)